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The EU made its first forays into the field of public and 
cultural diplomacy when the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) was created a decade ago. In 2016 the 
Joint Communication of the European Commission 
and the EEAS, titled ‘Towards an EU strategy for 
international cultural relations’,1 made further headway. 
The Communication and the accompanying 
preparatory studies2 concluded that  enormous potential 
existed for the EU’s cultural diplomacy, but that a 
strategy to realise that potential was lacking.  
This brief argues that the EU should use the 
momentum of post-COVID recovery for strategically 
aligning its cultural diplomacy with the climate and 
sustainability agenda. 
 
Culture has received only limited attention in the 
EU’s ambitious transition to a climate-neutral 
economy and environmentally conscious society. 
History, however, suggests that culture has a 
significant role to play in recovering from a crisis, 
be it war, economic recession or an epidemic. 
Well-known artistic and architectural movements 
such as the Renaissance, Romanticism and Neo-
Classicism came about as a direct or indirect 
response to various shocks.3  
A similar observation can be made about the limited 
recognition of cultural diplomacy in the post-COVID 
international politics. Ambitious global agendas such 
as implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement 
and the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) regard cultural cooperation as nice to 
have, but not indispensable. This may not remain so 
for long. The more climate change and policies 
concerning its mitigation and adaptation affect people 
and the environment in which they live, the bigger the 
role of culture will be. Hence, the momentum exists 
for the EU’s cultural diplomacy to play a constructive 
role in the important culture-climate nexus. 
 
However, the EU also needs to address 
challenges and limits to its current cultural 
diplomacy. The EU’s capacity to act as a global 
cultural actor has been undercut by a lack of 
leadership and having an agenda too broad and 
somewhat amorphous to make an impact. At the 
same time, as the analysis here suggests, behind 
these shortcomings lie unresolved strategic 
questions about what the EU’s cultural 
diplomacy is actually about. A strategic question 
can be formulated as to whether the EU’s cultural 
diplomacy should serve as an instrument to 
 
 





project some kind of European soft power onto 
other actors, or as an instrument of co-creation 
with others.  
 
The EU’s domestic ‘green and digital recovery’ 
agenda creates opportunities for the Union’s 
cultural diplomacy to move beyond this 
dichotomy, and perhaps also to gain in terms of 
priority and leadership. The European Green 
Deal (EGD), the flagship policy of the European 
Commission to achieve climate neutrality by 
2050, has a cultural dimension, albeit a very 
nascent and limited one. This cultural dimension 
could be extended into the EU’s diplomacy to 
create a mutually reinforcing dynamic. The more 
progress the EU makes in implementing the 
EGD, the bigger the role of climate in its external 
relations, including culture. Two new initiatives at 
the intersection of climate and culture – the 
European Climate Pact and the New European 
Bauhaus – are particularly relevant and worth 
carrying over into the EU’s cultural diplomacy.   
 
IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY 
Since its inception, the EU’s cultural diplomacy 
has had to deal with two sets of obstacles, one of 
which is structural. Culture may appear to be a 
rather natural topic for the EU’s external 
relations given Europe’s rich history, 
contribution to the arts and sciences, as well as 
the size of Europe’s cultural and tourist 
industries.  
 
At the same time, in the process of European 
integration, cultural policy has been retained 
under the sovereign competence of EU member 
states. The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 defines that the 
EU and its member states may together foster 
cooperation with third countries and 
international organisations in the sphere of 
culture. The European institutions are meant to 
complement national cultural policies and 
diplomacies, not to steer them in a particular 
direction. In this respect, the EU’s cultural 
diplomacy is akin to European defence.  While 
collectively the European countries present a 
formidable military might, the European Union 
lacks an army of its own. In the cultural domain, 
member states also prefer to showcase European 
culture, heritage, and arts under their national 
banners. Striking a balance between national and 
EU levels, and carving out  a role for the EU’s 
own cultural diplomacy has been a challenge for 
Brussels.   
 
With the establishment of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, cultural diplomacy 
has found an institutional home where it remains 
under the broad rubric of public diplomacy. This gives 
rise to the second set of obstacles, namely that of 
defining the scope and content for this branch of the 
EU’s external relations.  
 
Significant steps were taken in 2016–2017 to define 
what the EU’s cultural diplomacy should entail. The 
Joint Communication of the European Commission 
and the EEAS of 2016 states that EU stakeholders 
should work together to ‘advance successful 
cooperation with partner countries in the three work 
streams: culture as an engine for sustainable social and 
economic development; intercultural dialogue for 
peaceful inter-community relations; and reinforced 
cooperation on cultural heritage’.  
 
The European Parliament, in an own-initiative report 
in 2017 prepared by the Foreign Affairs and Culture 
Committees in response to the Joint Communication, 
defined the scope of cultural diplomatic action around 
two main strands: as a complementary tool to 
implement the EU’s Global Strategy, an overarching 
concept for the EU’s external relations, and as a way 
for the EU to develop its public people-to-people 
diplomacy.4 The Parliament’s report also included a 
substantial list of various activities where culture can 
play a role, from human rights to the rule of law, 
freedom and democracy, youth, sports, scientific 
 
 





cooperation, heritage protection and many others. 
This Christmas tree-like assortment of missions and 
goals is also visible in the Conclusions of the 
European Council, which provided the Council’s 
view on that subject in 2017. The Council added that 
cultural diplomacy should be a bottom-up process 
that needs to respect the independence of the cultural 
sector. The Council also stressed that cultural diversity 
within the EU would need to be acknowledged in the 
EU’s cultural relations with third countries.  
 
The stock-taking of 2016–17 led to a conclusion 
among policy actors that a strategic framework 
for the EU’s cultural diplomacy was necessary. As 
an EU policy that had to find a standing of its 
own and which was also lacking in political 
prioritising, cultural diplomacy had to absorb 
what was delegated to it. A wide range of goals 
and topics need not be a critical aspect in itself, 
particularly because all of these topics are rather 
attractive and certainly resonate with different 
European and external audiences. A sharpening 
of the agenda would certainly be welcome, 
however. 
 
The practical issues of competence and 
subsidiarity – the division of labour between the 
EU and member states – are also not that critical 
as they need to be dealt with in every aspect of 
the EU’s policies. Seemingly being a low-politics 
area, cultural diplomacy may even escape being 
stuck in narrow high-politics bottlenecks like 
European defence.  
 
That said, there seem to be deeper problems vis-
à-vis the EU’s cultural diplomacy than those of 
coordination and focus. These questions concern 
the strategic premise of such diplomacy and its 
expected impact. One set of expectations is based 
on the premise of the EU’s public diplomacy 
being a soft power tool. Another set of 
expectations proceeds from the premise of 
cultural diplomacy as a tool to engage with  others 
on a broad range of developmental issues. The 
expectation in this context is that this 
engagement takes place by means of co-creation 
on an equal footing with partners.  
 
In both instances, the expectations don’t appear 
to match the realities on the ground. The rise of 
authoritarianism in Russia and Turkey is often 
cited as an example of the EU’s weakness in 
projecting the soft power of its democratic model 
to neighbours. In development policy circles, the 
EU is criticised for clinging to an outdated ‘top-
down’ approach in dealing with partners. 
  
Furthermore, it is important to take a critical look 
at the strategic premises, namely these two 
images of cultural diplomacy as a soft power tool 
and as an instrument for enhancing people-to- 
people cooperation. While not a priori 
antagonistic, these images are not perfectly 
complementary either. Finally, as this brief 
suggests, the EU might achieve a more effective 
and tangible impact by aligning its cultural 
diplomacy with what appears to be the main 
priority for the EU’s own economic and societal 
development, namely mitigating and adapting to 
climate change. 
 
 CULTURE AS A SOFT POWER TOOL 
Cultural diplomacy is often considered part of the soft 
power toolbox. The main purpose of applying soft power 
is, to borrow Joseph Nye’s famous definition, to ‘get 
others to do what they otherwise would not’, by non-
coercive means. Since its coinage in the early 1990s, the 
concept of soft power has been seen as an indispensable 
ingredient in the diplomacy of any international actor, 
perhaps even synonymous with the idea of diplomacy 
itself. The idea of employing cultural diplomacy as the 
EU’s soft power tool has featured in countless op-eds and 
political speeches. In practice, for the EU, wrapping 










In Nye’s original ‘soft power’ concept, ‘culture’ was 
understood as something that can be ‘projected’ onto the 
other as a sort of ideological treatment. In practice, 
however, culture is rarely about a homogeneous, one-way 
streaming of ideology. As the current age of identity 
politics and culture war suggests, culture is intrinsically 
linked to social interaction, interpretation and 
manipulation on all sides. Furthermore, culture is not the 
only factor that matters. As prominent social 
anthropologists Pippa Norris and Ronald Ingelhart have 
highlighted, the widespread ‘cultural backlash’ towards 
populism and against liberal values is not a result of 
someone’s illiberal soft power.  Factors like age, education, 
urbanisation and economic conditions play a role in the 
rise or decline of certain cultural values.5   
 
Secondly, even if cultural proximity and exchanges do 
exist, they may or may not translate into a positive political 
agenda. For example, Europe continues to remain an 
attractive tourist destination and a source of high-end 
consumer and cultural goods for the elites in countries like 
China and Russia, or in the Middle East. But this alone 
does not provide more room for diplomatic engagement. 
Suggestions to use culture as a kind of platform for peace 
and engagement with Russia, for example, have yet to 
yield any positive results.6  
 
Turning to another part of the EU’s cultural diplomacy 
agenda, namely the promotion of ‘European values’ such 
as liberal democracy, human rights or the rule of law in its 
Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, the effectiveness 
of culture as a soft power is limited to the will and capacity 
of the EU to go further in integrating its neighbours. No 
matter how intense the inter-cultural dialogue, in the 
absence of consistent economic and political integration, 
there is only so much that culture alone can do.  
 
Finally, one could argue that, in order to be successful,  
‘soft power’ diplomacy should keep culture out of the 
equation altogether. China’s diplomacy is a case in point. 
Although China has invested significantly in public 
diplomacy, its soft power relies more on its economic 
attractiveness and investment opportunities. One expert 
interprets President Xi Jinping’s call for “a community of 
shared destiny”, as ‘soft power’ turned on its head: “You 
don’t have to want to be like us, you don’t have to want 
what we want; you can participate in a new form of 
globalization while retaining your own culture, ideology 
and institutions.”7 
 
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS A DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY  
Another approach to culture in diplomacy is to see it as 
an enhancer of the transformative, developmental 
agenda that emerged under the rubric of the 17 United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), or 
Agenda 2030. Here, the Christmas tree approach of the 
Joint Communication might present an opportunity. 
The EU’s cultural diplomacy can be seen as a stem onto 
which various developmental issues representing 
different SDGs can be grafted. Yet coupling culture with 
different SDGs is not easy.  
 
One example is culture and human rights.  The 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
to which the EU is a party (and considers the 
Convention an important reference point), defines 
human rights as one of the basic principles for 
international cultural cooperation. Yet an analysis of 
the practical implementation of the Convention 
shows that human rights and cultural rights are treated 
as two different things by the parties. As one expert 
notes, ‘human rights are referred to (in the 
implementation reports submitted by the parties to 
the UNESCO Secretariat) not as substantive rights or 
concrete obligations, but more as supporting notions 
for certain policies.’8 
 
Despite the fact that culture is often mentioned in 
policy discourse, it is difficult to measure the impact 
of cultural diplomacy on the implementation of 
various SDGs, such as  gender equality, sustainable 
cities, climate action, and peacebuilding. It is 
noteworthy that the EU’s own record on 
implementation of the SDGs remains mixed. This 
 
 





creates additional difficulty for the EU when it comes 
to leading by example.  
 
Another challenge has more to do  with the ‘diplomacy’ 
part of cultural diplomacy. While governments play an 
important role in the world of SDGs, other non-state 
actors such as civil society organisations and private 
philanthropies are equally as crucial.9 
 
It would be unfair to conclude that the EU does not 
recognise these challenges. Both the Joint 
Communication and Preparatory Action ‘Culture in EU 
external relations’10 make references to people-to-people 
contacts and multi-stakeholder ownership. In 2016 the 
Commission organised the Cultural Relations Platform 
(CRP), designed to support the EU in engaging in 
international cultural relations ‘based on a set of shared 
principles, and new activities, aiming to promote and 
facilitate sustainable cultural exchanges, people-to-
people activities, and co-creation processes between 
Europeans and citizens from countries all over the 
world’. 11 It needs to be said, however, that the CRP 
activities are first and foremost supportive of the EU’s 
policy and their impact is yet to be evaluated.  
 
Can these EU cultural diplomacy dilemmas be eased, 
if not resolved?  One way of doing this is by focusing 
on the mutual interests of the EU and other 
international actors. The many adverse effects of 
climate change on cultural heritage, industries and 
actors might help in localising these mutual interests.  
 
‘GREENING’ THE EU’S CULTURAL 
DIPLOMACY   
As the European Council underlined in its January 
2021 Conclusions on the EU’s climate diplomacy, the 
EU should pursue external policy goals in all policy 
fields that are relevant for addressing climate change. 
Moreover, although culture is not mentioned in the 
Council’s Conclusions, it is implied there. One can 
make this assumption based on the recent initiatives 
that the Commission undertook in order to bring its 
green policies closer to the people and to turn them in 
this respect into cultural and societal projects. The 
‘greening’ of the EU’s cultural diplomacy can be seen 
as a process whereby culture is moving closer to the 
EU’s climate mitigation and adaptation policies, and 
could benefit the EU in two respects. 
 
First, by being more engaged with the culture-climate 
nexus, the EU could generate more cooperation with 
others based on the common perception of climate 
change as a threat multiplier. The negative effects of 
climate change on the culture of the Indigenous 
people in the Arctic region or the heritage sites across 
the globe are well known.12 Many of these heritage 
sites are located in areas that are going to be hardest 
hit by climate change, such as the World Heritage sites 
in Zanzibar, for example. The Commission is 
currently exploring innovative measures for the 
protection of European cultural heritage in relation to 
climate change. This work could be extended to 
include an external dimension under the EU’s cultural 
and climate diplomacy.  
 
Furthermore, the economic costs of climate change 
will most certainly affect cultural and creative sectors, 
as did the COVID-19 measures, for example. 
Developing and promoting innovative solutions, 
including digital tools, to help cultural actors adapt to 
climate change, can be part of the EU’s cultural 
diplomacy agenda.   
 
Second, as international climate adaptation and 
mitigation policies often appear to be technical and 
somewhat abstract for the individual, combining 
them with cultural projects would bring them closer 
to the local communities. Furthermore, by enabling 
and helping partner countries (cities, local 
communities) to work out their own solutions to 
sustainable tourism, preserving and re-valorising local 
heritage and integrating migrants would enhance the 











The European Green Deal has two interesting 
cultural sub-projects related to it, namely the New 
European Bauhaus and the European Climate Pact. 
These two sub-projects could be extended into the 
new green agenda for the EU’s cultural diplomacy. 
 
NEW EUROPEAN BAUHAUS  
The New European Bauhaus (NEB) is a relatively 
recent initiative by the Commission, launched in 
September 2020. In the Commission’s presentation, 
the NEB ‘wants to make the Green Deal a cultural, 
human centred and positive, “tangible” experience’. 13   
The initiative aims to highlight opportunities and 
hopes, and brings the Green Deal to the people by 
connecting architecture, design, climate science, as 
well as policies for social inclusiveness and equality. 
The NEB’s three dimensions are sustainability 
(including the circularity of materials used in the built 
environment), quality of experience (including 
aesthetics), and inclusion (including affordability).  
 
Currently, this initiative is in its co-design phase and is 
intended to be duly rolled out in five pilot locations in 
Europe. However, the potential exists to extend it to 
partner countries outside the EU. One possible area 
for collaborative architectural design in such an 
extended framework would be the African countries. 
As both rural and urban communities in Africa are 
undergoing complex processes of urbanisation, 
climate change adds greater urgency. In addition, a 
host of developmental problems spurred by 
demographic growth calls for the kind of solutions 
that the NEB intends to find in Europe, albeit on a 
much larger scale. Arguably the most innovative 
element of the NEB is the idea of using culture and 
creativity to nurture urban regeneration and climate 
resilience. It would be commendable for the new 
generation of NEB pilots to be organised in the 
framework of the EU-Africa partnership, for 
example.  
 
In April 2021, the Commission launched the ‘New 
European Bauhaus Prize’ for projects in the thematic 
areas of the NEB. While it is not clear whether the 
prize is going to be awarded on a regular basis, it 
would be an interesting innovation to include 
international cooperative projects with European 
actors realised outside the EU in future competitions.   
 
Should this initiative indeed form part of the EU’s 
cultural diplomacy, some of the criticism that the 
NEB has received to date will have to be addressed. 
As one commentator pointed out, in order for the 
NEB to develop effectively and to be welcomed 
globally, the significance of its international and 
intercultural dimensions, through cultural relations, 
will have to be explicitly stated from the outset as one 
of its essential components. 14    
 
Added to this is the weak ‘buy-in’ of member states 
into the NEB. Currently, the Commission has been 
largely in the driving seat, organising events and 
disseminating information. One could envisage 
member states integrating the NEB concept into their 
own climate and cultural networks. Some member 
states, if not all 27, could act as NEB ambassadors 
outside the EU.  
 
This brings us back to the issue of the balance of 
interests in the EU’s cultural diplomacy, however. It 
remains to be seen whether the unique and innovative 
character of the NEB could help this initiative to be 
taken over by member states, while retaining it as an 
EU project. An interesting case in point is the 
Portugal-based Bauhaus of the Seas initiative.15 This 
initiative is inspired by the NEB and takes it further 
into the field of sustainability of the ocean and coastal 
communities and their heritage. While it is not a part 
of Portugal’s diplomacy, the Bauhaus of the Seas 
nonetheless sheds new light on Portugal as a coastal 
European country with a history of seafaring and 
exploration, calling for ‘continental mobilisation 
around the first and most decisive global natural 











A CULTURE-CLIMATE PACT? 
In December 2020, the EU launched the European 
Climate Pact. According to the Commission’s 
Communication, the European Climate Pact is an 
initiative for engaging with different stakeholders and 
civil society, with the aim of committing them to climate 
action and more sustainable behaviour. It will offer ways 
for people and organisations to learn about climate 
change, to develop and implement solutions, and to 
connect with others to multiply the impact of those 
solutions. The Commission intends to create a ‘lively 
space to share information, debate and act on the climate 
crisis. The Pact will offer support for a European climate 
movement to grow and consolidate’. 16 
 
There are multiple commonalities between what the 
Climate Pact wants to achieve and what is often called 
for in the field of international cultural cooperation. 
The active and meaningful participation of citizens 
and communities is necessary in both climate and 
culture. In the Climate Pact, participation is regarded 
as part of the broader collaboration and co-creation of 
local knowledge. The logic of the Climate Pact with its 
network of informal climate ambassadors comes 
close to the idea of multiple ownership, which is often 
discussed in the context of cultural goods being 
essentially public goods.  
 
In light of these interlinkages, one idea for further 
action would be to extend the Climate Pact into a kind 
of Culture-Climate Pact. This initiative would be 
based on the joint pledge of addressing climate change 
through cultural solutions, some of which could be 




This brief started by looking at the challenges and 
limits of the EU’s cultural diplomacy. Employing 
culture as a soft power tool is not unproblematic, 
particularly for an actor like the EU. Another familiar 
image of cultural diplomacy is that of building bridges 
between countries and communities. In this regard, 
the impact that the EU has achieved is difficult to 
measure.  
 
Aligning climate goals and culture might give the EU’s 
cultural diplomacy a much-needed focus and, given 
the urgency of the climate crisis, a sense of leadership. 
As the Commission has launched a batch of new 
initiatives within the European Green Deal 
framework, the moment for a new start in cultural 
diplomacy has arrived. The coming years will be 
crucial for the EU to create a working interface for a 
mutually reinforcing culture-climate action. One goal 
of this action can be formulated in terms of 
empowering European cultural and creative actors to 
engage internationally with tackling the most 
important challenge of the 21st century.  
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